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PUBLIC PROGRAMS, PRIVATE 
FINANCING 
MARGARET H. LEMOS* & GUY-URIEL CHARLES** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
What sorts of organizations should we rely on to deliver goods and services 
to the public? Economic theory typically divides the universe of options into 
three sectors: the private market, the public sector, and the nonprofit or 
philanthropic sector.1 Each sector has unique strengths and weaknesses, and 
none is capable of dealing effectively with the full range of social problems. The 
interesting question has always been how to allocate resources and 
responsibilities among the different sectors so as to harness the strengths and 
compensate for the weaknesses of each type. One might approach that question 
by thinking about how organizations from different sectors can complement each 
other: government, for example, might play a valuable role in correcting private 
market failures.2 But it also is possible to imagine hybrid arrangements in which 
different types of organizations work together, creating a sum that is greater than 
the whole of its parts. For example, many advocates of privatization argue that 
the government can deliver public goods more efficiently if it relies on private 
firms to do some or all of the work.3  On that view, combining the government’s 
political decision-making processes and power of compulsory taxation with 
market competition and profit motive produces results that surpass what either 
the public or private sector could accomplish in isolation. 
This article examines a different approach to hybridization—one in which for-
profit investment and/or philanthropic donations are used to fund government. 
The first combination, commonly known as a “public-private partnership,” has 
been prevalent in other parts of the world at least since the 1990s, and is on the 
rise in the United States.4 The second, dubbed “patriotic philanthropy” by one of 
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 1.  See generally, e.g., BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY (1988) (situating 
nonprofits alongside government and the private market in a three-sector economy). 
 2.  See infra Part I. 
 3.  See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1030–34 (2013) 
(describing efficiency rationales for privatization of government functions). 
 4.  See, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: GLOBAL P3 
LANDSCAPE 9–10 (Sept. 8, 2014) (describing the expanding public-private partnership market in the 
U.S.). 
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its most prominent practitioners, likewise shows signs of growth.5 Public-private 
partnerships have received substantial attention in the already-vast literature on 
the privatization of government functions.6 Most treatments, however, focus on 
the promise and peril of relying on profit-motivated firms to produce or deliver 
public services and amenities; the implications of private financing are of 
secondary concern. Meanwhile, patriotic philanthropy has flown almost entirely 
below the academic radar, perhaps because it is difficult to find fault with gifts, 
or because the phenomenon is decentralized and difficult to track.7 
The goal of this article is to begin to trace some of the consequences of public 
reliance on private funding. Commentators focused on campaign finance and 
lobbying have explored similar questions that arise when public officials are 
dependent on private money for political support.8  Those explorations provide 
some insights into the incentives of government officials who face, for example, 
the prospect of large donations to support new public initiatives. But private 
financing for government programs also raises a distinct set of concerns about 
government capacity, and about the important differences between modes of 
funding that are collective and compulsory, on the one hand, and individualized 
and voluntary, on the other. We cannot hope to give those issues comprehensive 
treatment in this short essay. Our aim, rather, is to stimulate a conversation about 
the values at stake in decisions about how—and by whom—public services are 
funded. 
The discussion that follows proceeds in three parts. Part I sketches the 
conventional divisions between for-profit, governmental, and nonprofit 
organizations, highlighting some of the most critical advantages and 
disadvantages of each type. Part II describes public-private partnerships and 
patriotic philanthropy in more detail. Both hybrid forms appear at first blush to 
be best-of-both-worlds combinations of public capacity and private initiative. Yet 
there are reasons for pessimism as well as optimism, and Part II outlines some of 
 
 5.  See Margaret H. Lemos & Guy-Uriel Charles, Patriotic Philanthropy? Financing the State with 
Gifts to Government, 106 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
 6.  See, e.g., Pamela Bloomfield, The Challenging Business of Long-Term Public-Private 
Partnerships: Reflections on Local Experience, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 400 (2006); Dominique Custos & 
John Reitz, Public-Private Partnerships, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (2010); John Forrer et al., Public-Private 
Partnerships and the Public Accountability Question, 70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 475 (2010); David W. Gaffey, 
Outsourcing Infrastructure: Expanding the Use of Public-Private Partnerships in the United States, 39 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 351 (2010); Paul Landow & Carol Ebdon, Public-Private Partnerships, Public Authorities, and 
Democratic Governance, 35 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 727 (2012). On privatization more 
generally, see, for example, JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, 
PRIVATE MEANS (1989); GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
(Judy Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); Michaels, supra note 3. 
 7.  See Lemos & Charles, supra note 5, at Part II.C (offering a descriptive account of patriotic 
philanthropy and noting that, although private financing for public education has provoked significant 
debate, most of it has been focused on the substance of philanthropic interventions rather than the fact 
of private financing for government programs).  
 8.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A 
PLAN TO STOP IT (2012). 
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the relevant considerations. Part III considers the relationship between private 
funding and the public treasury. It is tempting to view private financing for 
government as a supplement to public revenues. That perspective suggests that 
the effects of private financing should be, at worst, neutral; the public sector 
should be left no worse off by an infusion of additional funds. We think that view 
is mistaken. For a variety of reasons, private and public funds may operate as 
substitutes, not supplements. Part III fleshes out that argument, explaining why 
private funding may lead to redistributions or contractions of the public fisc. 
II 
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN A THREE-SECTOR ECONOMY 
Economic theory distinguishes among three types of organizations that 
provide goods and services to the public: for-profit enterprises, government, and 
nonprofit or philanthropic organizations. The three types of organizations differ 
in various ways, including how they derive revenue and what they can do with it. 
Those differences, in turn, translate into distinctive strengths and weaknesses for 
each type. 
A. The Private Sector 
Economists long have emphasized the capacity of the private market to devise 
efficient means of satisfying individuals’ wants and needs. As Adam Smith wrote 
in The Wealth of Nations, “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their 
self-interest.”9 The lure of profit encourages managers to meet consumer 
demands while minimizing cost. And competition among firms prevents 
managers from maximizing profit by sacrificing quality or charging excessive 
prices. 
Despite their promise, markets can fail to allocate resources effectively, 
resulting in a smaller pie than would exist under ideal conditions.10 There are 
various types of market failure, most stemming from informational challenges; 
two are particularly relevant to the discussion here.11 The first arises when there 
is an information asymmetry between producers and consumers—when 
 
 9.  ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 14 (Random House 1937) (quoted in WEISBROD, 
supra note 1, at 45). 
 10.  Julian Le Grand, The Theory of Government Failure, 21 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 423, 425 (1991) 
(“[F]ormally, an allocation of resources is defined as allocatively efficient if it is impossible to re-allocate 
resources in such a way more persons better off without making someone else worse off: a definition that 
is also known (after its originator) as Pareto-efficiency.”).  
 11.  See, e.g., Charles Wolf, Jr., A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementation 
Analysis, 22 J. L. & ECON. 107 (1979) (identifying some reasons for market failure including externalities, 
public goods, information asymmetry, and distributional equity). For seminal discussions of market 
failure, see, for example, JESSE BURKHEAD & JERRY MINER, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 97–144 (1971); 
Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351 (1958); Paul A. Samuelson, The 
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STATS. 387 (1954). 
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producers have more information than consumers about the nature, cost, and 
quality of goods. In order for competition to combat opportunistic behavior by 
producers, consumers must be able to distinguish better products from worse 
ones, and to reward honest sellers by giving those sellers their business. That is 
easy enough to do when the quality of products is easily observable; consumers 
can judge for themselves whether one baker’s pies are tastier than another’s, and 
spend their money accordingly. The challenge is that some indicia of quality 
cannot be observed by consumers, or can only be observed with great difficulty. 
Those sorts of informational challenges can crop up where it is difficult to gauge 
whether another provider would have performed a particular service better. 
Legal services offer a ready illustration: a client may find it hard to assess her 
attorney’s performance—was a lawsuit won or lost because of or in spite of the 
attorney?—or to determine whether another attorney might have been more 
successful or more efficient with her hours.12 In circumstances like this, the profit-
drive associated with the private market is not a feature but a bug. If producers 
are pursuing their self-interest, the quest for profit gives them an incentive to cut 
corners, pad bills, and so on. 
A second type of market failure arises from the well-known problem of free-
riders. The private market is likely to undersupply so-called collective or public 
goods—products or services that can be enjoyed by many people regardless of 
whether they have paid for them. Conventional examples include national 
defense, environmental protection, and public sanitation measures. Individual 
consumers may want those things but not be willing to pay for them, or to pay 
the full cost. Instead, individuals may hope that others will pay and that they will 
be able to enjoy the benefits for free. Because demand will appear to be low, the 
private market will tend to produce less of collective goods and services than the 
public actually wants and needs.13 
Both types of market failures stand as impediments to an efficient allocation 
of resources. But private markets have other limitations as well. Although 
efficiency is the north star in most economic theory, it is not the only relevant 
value; equity may matter, too. That is, one might care not only about the overall 
size of the pie, but also how it is sliced and distributed among individuals. There 
is little reason to believe that private markets are well-suited to serve values 
associated with distributional equity. On the contrary, “most economists have 
acknowledged that, even at a theoretic level, the income distribution generated 
by a private market would not necessarily, or even probably, be ethically 
desirable, even if all people began life with equal endowments of human and 
 
 12.  WEISBROD, supra note 1, at 46. 
 13.  This can be understood as a different kind of informational asymmetry—one in which 
consumers possess more information than producers. See id. at 6 (“Consumers, in the aggregate, may 
highly value particular collective services . . . . But individual consumers may find that self-interest 
dictates acting as if they cared little, in the hope that others will pay for the services. Consumers do not 
have the incentive to reveal their true willingness to pay, by making voluntary payments, if they feel that 
they can benefit from others’ contributions.”).  
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material capital, but especially if they did not.”14 
B. The Public Sector 
Where private markets fall short—whether with regard to allocative 
efficiency or distributional equity or both—government can offer a needed 
curative. Indeed, economists often conceptualize government primarily, if not 
exclusively, as a means of addressing the shortcomings of the private market. In 
that framing, the private sector is the default; the role of government, and of 
private philanthropy, is to cure market failures. One need not adopt that framing, 
however—nor the implication that a free market is logically prior to the state—
to recognize that one of the functions of government may be to supply the goods 
that private markets are unlikely to provide on their own.15 
As compared to the private sector, the government offers a different set of 
strengths and weaknesses. Government officials are paid fixed salaries; they do 
not take home more money at the end of the year if they figure out a clever way 
to cut costs, build a better widget, or drum up consumer demand. The upside is 
that government may be able to avoid the first type of market failure described 
above: When it comes to goods and services with difficult-to-observe qualities, 
civil servants may be more trustworthy providers than the managers of for-profit 
enterprises.16 And even if the government does not provide the good or service 
itself, it can regulate in ways that minimize the risk of opportunistic behavior by 
for-profit providers.17 
In addition to the power to regulate, government possesses the power to tax, 
to extract revenues from individuals who may not be willing to pay voluntarily. 
That means that government can avoid free-rider problems—the second type of 
market failure described above—simply by compelling individuals to contribute 
to the financing of public goods. You do not want to chip in on the cost of national 
defense, public schools and highways, or environmental-protection efforts? Too 
bad. Taxes are compulsory, and they cannot be avoided on the ground that other 
people, who may or may not be taxpayers, will also benefit from the services your 
tax dollars support.18 
 
 
 14.  BURTON A. WEISBROD ET AL., PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS 9 (1978). 
 15.  See Barry Bozeman, Public-Value Failure: When Efficient Markets May Not Do, 62 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 145 (2002) (challenging the market-failure framing). 
 16.  See, e.g., WEISBROD, supra note 1, at 43–58 
 17.  See generally, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (using concepts 
of market failure to explain and evaluate regulations). 
 18.  See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) (“‘Compelled support of 
government’—even those programs of government one does not approve—is of course perfectly 
constitutional, as every taxpayer must attest.”); DAVID J. MCCARTHY, JR. & LAURIE REYNOLDS, 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 382 (2003) (“Taxes are imposed without consideration of whether the 
individual taxpayer will benefit from the services to be funded by the tax.”).  
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The government also assesses demand in a markedly different fashion than 
the private market—by votes, as opposed to willingness and ability to pay. A 
political decision process that relies on votes rather than payments “allows 
everyone who is affected by the consumption and production of a good or a 
service to have a say in its level of provision.”19 This feature can help government 
overcome certain types of market failures, because if the consumption or 
production of a good or service generates externalities—either positive or 
negative—the political process can take those into account. Likewise, a “one 
person, one vote” system can promote values associated with equity by weighing 
everyone’s preferences equally, whereas the “one dollar, one vote” metric in the 
private sector gives greater weight to those with more dollars to spend.20 
The fact that the government is capable of stepping in to address market 
failures does not mean that it will, of course. Moving from the private to the 
public sector does not mean abandoning concerns about failure so much as 
renaming them—and so the topic becomes government failure instead of market 
failure.21 To begin with, the nature of the political process suggests that 
government will only provide collective goods that enjoy majority support.22 But 
it might fail even to do that. The same collective-action problems that can impede 
effective private action also can get in the way of valuable government 
interventions—even those that a majority of citizens would favor. As one 
commentator observed, “[f]or government to act, substantial segments of the 
public must be aroused, public officials must be informed, laws must be written, 
majorities must be assembled, and programs must be put into action.”23 Those 
challenges are particularly pronounced when the action in question will bestow 
 
 19.  Le Grand, supra note 10, at 436. 
 20.  Id.; see also WEISBROD ET AL., supra note 14, at 34–35 (discussing differences between one-
person-one-vote and one-dollar-one-vote demand mechanisms). 
 21.  For extended discussions of government failure, see generally CHARLES WOLF, JR., MARKETS 
OR GOVERNMENTS: CHOOSING BETWEEN IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 34–102 (2d ed. 1993); Le Grand, 
supra note 10; cf. Bozeman, supra note 15 (discussing a form of government failure that the author calls 
“public value failures”). The vast literature on public-choice theory is also, of course, relevant to the 
question of government failure. Seminal works include KENNETH JOSEPH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE 
AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS 
OF CONSENT (1962); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
(1971); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS (1965); GEORGE JOSEPH STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 
(1975).  
 22.  Rob Reich, What are Foundations For?, BOSTON REV. (Mar. 1, 2013), http://bostonreview.net/ 
forum/foundations-philanthropy-democracy [https://perma.cc/JY9V-AQ35] (“If a majority of citizens 
prefer police protection and a minority prefers arts funding, then politicians will vote to fund the police 
and not the arts. Further, standard models of political behavior in a democracy predict that politicians 
will fund the public goods preferred by majorities at a level that satisfies the “median voter,” who sits in 
the middle of the political spectrum. . . . So public funding of the arts may generate plenty of Norman 
Rockwell, but probably not avant-garde or radical art.”).  
 23.  Lester M. Salamon, Of Market Failure, Voluntary Failure, and Third-Party Government: Toward 
a Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State, 16 NONPROFIT & 
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 29, 39 (1987). 
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benefits on the public at large, or a large and diffuse segment of the public—as 
will be the case for many collective goods.24 Just as individuals may prefer to free-
ride off of others’ willingness to pay for such goods, they may fail to contribute 
to the political efforts, like organization and lobbying, that are necessary to spur 
government to action.25 
Finally, even when government acts, it may fail to act effectively, because the 
same feature that makes government less likely to exploit unsuspecting 
consumers—the absence of profit motive—also means that government agents 
have weak incentives to innovate or to minimize costs.26 
C. The Philanthropic Sector 
The voluntary, or nonprofit, or philanthropic sector offers an alternative to 
the private and public sectors, and shares features in common with both. Like 
private-sector organizations, nonprofits have no power to compel action but must 
rely on voluntary transfers from individuals and firms. Like government, 
nonprofits, and the people who run them, are limited in their ability to take 
advantage of any surpluses they produce.27 
These features help shape the role that the voluntary sector can play in 
relation to the private market and the state. On the one hand, the absence of a 
profit motive reduces the incentives that nonprofit managers and other 
philanthropists might have to use informational asymmetries to bilk unsuspecting 
members of the public. As a result, nonprofits—like government—may be better 
suited than private firms to provide goods and services that lack easily observable 
indicia of quality. On the other hand, and in contrast to government, nonprofits 
need not operate under majority rule, but can serve interests that are decidedly 
minoritarian in orientation.28 Thus, private philanthropy can offer an important 
supplement to government, particularly when it comes to producing collective 
goods that lack majority support or powerful political backing.29 Rob Reich 
explains: 
 
 24.  See generally OLSON, supra note 21. 
 25.  WEISBROD, supra note 1, at 5 (“[G]overnment enterprises face political pressures that make 
them excessively responsive to well-organized demands from industry and other pressure groups but far 
less responsive to the interests of poorly organized groups such as consumers.”). 
 26.  See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 6; Michaels, supra note 3. Cf. WOLF, supra note 21, at 65 
(“Where the revenues that sustain an activity are unrelated to the costs of producing it, more resources 
may be used than necessary to produce a given output, or more of the nonmarket activity may be 
provided than is warranted by the original market-failure reason for undertaking it in the first place.”). 
 27.  WEISBROD, supra note 1, at 41–42. 
 28.  Id. at 6–7 (“In a democratic society in which governments tend to be responsive to majority 
wants, there is a need for institutions that can respond to the demands of persons who feel intensely about 
particular collective-type activities, such as the preservation of Carnegie Hall or other landmarks, 
research on muscular dystrophy, or helping native Americans.”). 
 29.  For an empirical analysis see Yoshiho Matsunaga & Naoto Yamauchi, Is the Government Failure 
Theory Still Relevant?: A Panel Analysis Using US State Level Data, 75 ANN. PUB. COOP. ECON. 227 
(2004).  
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In a democratic state, one simple way to predict what public goods will be produced is 
to look at which public goods are favored by a majority of citizens. . . . Foundations [and 
other philanthropic organizations] can yield more idiosyncratic results. . . . In a 
pluralistic democracy, people have diverse preferences about what kinds of goods to 
supply through the direct expenditure of tax dollars. Powered by donor preferences and 
free from the accountability logic of the market and democratic state, foundations can 
help to provide a welcome pluralism of public goods. The diversity of goods supplied by 
foundation grantees helps to create an ever evolving, contestatory, and diverse arena of 
civil society. Such decentralization tempers government orthodoxy.30 
The same features that contribute to the strengths of the voluntary sector also 
feed into to its weaknesses, however—producing what one might think of as 
voluntary failures.31 Because nonprofits have to rely on voluntary payments, they 
run into a similar free-rider problem as the private market. Just like individuals 
might balk at paying for a good or service if they could reap the same benefits for 
free if others footed the bill, they might similarly hesitate before donating their 
money to worthy causes, hoping that other donors would make up the slack. If 
those potential other donors made the same calculation, the result would be 
rampant under-funding for nonprofits and their projects. Indeed, the strongest 
versions of free-rider theory would suggest that there should be very little private 
philanthropy at all.32 That is plainly not the reality; the voluntary sector is alive 
and well in the U.S., flush from a record-breaking $390 billion in donations in 
2016.33 Nevertheless, the potential for free riding and other obstacles to collective 
action stands as an impediment to funding collective goods with voluntary 
individual donations. 
Granted, nonprofits need not rely on an aggregation of modest gifts; all it 
takes is one mega-rich philanthropist or foundation to cut through the Gordian 
knot of organizational challenges and other transaction costs to get results.34 But 
that possibility also highlights another limitation of the voluntary sector: its 
reliance on wealthy individuals. As one commentator explains, private 
philanthropy “inevitably vests most of the influence over the definition of 
community needs in the hands of those in command of the greatest resources . . . 
. The nature of the sector thus comes to be shaped by the preferences not of the 
 
 30.  Reich, supra note 22.  
 31.  Salamon, supra note 23, at 39 (linking the concept of “voluntary failure” to “inherent limitations 
of the voluntary or nonprofit sector”). 
 32.  TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 108 (1992) (“The large 
number of contributors associated with many charities raises a conundrum. If charities are providing a 
pure public good in their philanthropic activities, and if a large number of donors are relied upon for 
contributions, then the group should be latent and, hence, not form. . . . Yet fund-raising charities exist. 
Charities collect billions of dollars annually in the United States. . . . Clearly, the standard wisdom, drawn 
from conventional theories of pure public goods, does not apply to charities.”).  
 33.  Giving USA 2017 Infographic, GIVING USA (June 12, 2017), https://givingusa.org/see-the-
numbers-giving-usa-2017-infographic/ [https://perma.cc/7CE3-W5NB].  
 34.  Cf. Lemos & Charles, supra note 5, manuscript at 27 (noting that “philanthropy is becoming 
more top-heavy and donor-driven, with mega-rich ‘policy plutocrats’ ‘directing not only their money but 
also their time, ideas, and political leverage toward influencing public policy’” (quoting Kristin A. Goss, 
Policy Plutocrats: How America’s Wealthy Seek to Influence Government, 94 PS: POL. SCI. & POL’Y 442, 
442 (July 2016))).  
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community as a whole, but of its wealthy members. As a consequence, some 
services favored by the wealthy, such as the arts, may be promoted, while others 
desired by the poor are held back.”35 
This problem is compounded in the U.S., at least, by the favorable tax 
treatment of charitable donations, which amounts to a government subsidy for 
donors’ chosen projects: The government permits individuals to forego paying a 
certain amount in taxes by giving the money instead to the organizations of their 
choice.36 As U.S. tax law is currently structured, the subsidy is only available to 
those in higher income brackets who itemize their deductions, and its magnitude 
increases as incomes and taxes climb higher.37 Some critics argue that the 
consequence is a “plutocratic bias,” because “the favored beneficiaries of the 
wealthy receive the lion’s share of the subsidy.”38 Others complain that “[m]oney 
that would otherwise be available for tax revenue that could be democratically 
directed is shielded from public control for private use.”39 
A related set of critiques sounds in democracy. Philanthropy can have 
profound consequences for many people, and yet those people have no means of 
influencing, much less controlling, the behavior of the philanthropists. As one 
skeptic put it, “[o]ur functioning democracy, as imperfect as it is, holds to the 
ideal that all people should have an equal voice.”40  Philanthropy operates outside 
of the democratic channels for public input, contestation, and deliberation; 
success is measured in terms of results, not process.41 
D. Hybridization 
The picture sketched here suggests that the private, public, and voluntary 
sectors sit alongside each other, operating as complements and sometimes as 
substitutes. Yet there has always been some blending of the categories—hybrid 
forms in which different types of organizations work together. The tax deduction 
for charitable donations, described above, can be understood as one form of 
hybridization, since it operates like a government subsidy for nonprofit 
organizations. The government also supports nonprofits even more directly by 
 
 35.  Salamon, supra note 23, at 41.  
 36.  See generally, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. 
REV. 1393 (1988). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Rob Reich, Toward a Political Theory of Philanthropy, in GIVING WELL: THE ETHICS OF 
PHILANTHROPY 177, 184 (Patricia Illingworth et al. eds., 2011). 
 39.  Gara LaMarche, Democracy and the Donor Class, 34 DEMOCRACY J., Fall 2014, at 3–4; see also 
Salamon, supra note 23, at 41 (“Since . . . private contributions are tax-deductible, . . . they have the effect 
not only of allocating private expenditures, but also of allocating foregone public resources as well, 
though without the benefit of any public decision process. Not only is this situation undemocratic, but it 
can also create a self-defeating sense of dependency on the part of the poor since it gives them no say 
over the resources that are spent on their behalf.”). 
 40.  Robin Rogers, Why Philanthro-Policymaking Matters, 48 SOCIETY 376, 377 (2011). 
 41.  Id. 
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contributing to them itself.42 As a result, private nonprofit organizations play a 
significant role in delivering the services that the government funds with tax 
revenues.43 
Government also can and does use tax policy, favorable interest rates, and 
other feats of financial wizardry to subsidize private for-profit enterprises. 
Further, public services have increasingly been privatized, meaning that the 
government relies on private firms to perform functions that would otherwise be 
discharged by public-sector employees. In effect, the government takes on the 
role of consumer who buys a product rather than making it.44 
We are interested in hybridization of a different type: scenarios in which 
government programs are funded by private actors, either via for-profit 
investments or philanthropic donations, or some combination of the two. Such 
arrangements often result in private actors taking over all or part of service-
delivery as well as financing, and in the discussion that follows we address the 
consequences for both inputs and outputs. Our primary interest, however, is in 
the consequences of private financing for the public sector. Although there is no 
shortage of scholarly and popular commentary on the relationship among the 
three sectors described above—and between public and private more generally—
the bulk of it focuses on questions of who or what is delivering goods and services 
to the public. Financing tends to fly under the radar, not because it is 
unimportant, but because commentators often assume that collecting and 
spending tax revenue is the irreducible minimum that government must do 
itself.45 That assumption, it turns out, is false. The remainder of this article 
considers the implications. 
III 
FOR-PROFIT AND PHILANTHROPIC INVESTMENT IN GOVERNMENT 
What are the consequences of bringing for-profit investment and charitable 
donations into the public sphere? Does private financing for public programs 
offer best-of-both-worlds opportunities to exploit the advantages of public and 
private initiative and to avoid the pitfalls associated with each of the sectors? Or 
 
 42.  See, e.g., Salamon, supra note 23, at 30 (“[G]overnment has emerged as the single most 
important source of nonprofit income.”); Steven Rathgeb Smith, Government and Nonprofits: Turning 
Points, Challenges, and Opportunities, NONPROFIT Q. (Sept. 21, 2009), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/ 
author/steven-rathgeb-smith/ [https://perma.cc/YV6F-YV5R] (describing government support for 
nonprofits).  
 43.  Salamon, supra note 23. 
 44.  For a discussion of the “make or buy” decision more generally, see Paul L. Joskow, Vertical 
Integration, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 319 (Claude Menard & Mary M. 
Shirley eds., 2008). 
 45.  See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 738 (6th ed. 2015) (“Once you 
begin to take the idea of privatization seriously, you can quickly come to the view that government could 
be reduced to the performance of three tasks: the collection of revenue by taxation, the choice of services 
this revenue should buy, and the negotiation and drafting (and, perhaps, the monitoring) of contracts 
with private businesses for the delivery of the chosen services.”). 
LEMOSCHARLES_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2018  11:24 AM 
No. 3 2018] PUBLIC PROGRAMS, PRIVATE FINANCING 147 
 
does the hybridization undermine what is special about government, or private 
markets, or philanthropy, without a corresponding bump in benefits? Although 
this article cannot answer those questions conclusively, this Part and the next 
outline some of the key considerations, suggesting reasons for both optimism and 
concern. 
A. Public-Private Partnerships 
The first public-private combination we consider is of the for-profit variety: 
so-called public-private partnerships, also known as PPPs or P3s. Like more 
conventional modes of privatization, P3s typically feature the outsourcing of 
government functions: rather than developing and/or delivering a service to the 
public itself, government engages a private firm to do the work.46 But P3s take 
the role of the private sector one step further, by combining private performance 
of government functions with private financing of the relevant projects. 
Public-private partnerships tend to take one of two forms. In the first type, 
known as a demand-risk P3, a private developer fronts the money for a 
government project in exchange for the right to collect user fees that would 
otherwise have gone to the government.47 The second type of partnership is 
known as an availability-payment P3. Under the availability model, the 
government commits to paying the private partner(s) a set amount contingent on 
the project’s meeting certain quality benchmarks. Initial financing comes in 
whole or in part from the private entity, which then handles the work, while the 
government makes regular payments to cover operating and maintenance costs 
and to service any debt.48 
Public-private partnerships first emerged in the 1990s in the United Kingdom 
and in Australia, where the availability-payment model is most common. In Latin 
America, by contrast, P3s typically have taken the form of demand-risk projects. 
The U.S. market was dominated by demand-risk projects in its early stages, but 
is now shifting toward availability-payment P3s.49 P3s are currently used primarily 
for large infrastructural projects, including transportation initiatives such as 
roads, bridges, parking meters, and the like.50 Private investment is less common, 
 
 46.  Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (2003) 
(describing the prevalent model of privatization in the United States as “government use of private 
entities to implement government programs or to provide services to others on the government’s 
behalf”). 
 47.  MOODY’S, supra note 4. 
 48.  Id. (describing availability-payment P3s). 
 49.  Id.; see generally MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., CERTAIN US P3 OBLIGATIONS WILL BE 
TREATED AS GOVERNMENT DEBT (Feb. 2, 2015) (describing trend toward availability-payment P3s). 
 50.  Ryan Holeywell, The Indiana Toll Road: A Model for Privatization?, GOVERNING MAG. (Oct. 
2011), http://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/indiana-toll-road-model-privatization.html 
[https://perma.cc/6SZM-W5MN] (“[G]overnments’ desire for P3s is on the rise. With state and federal 
highway budgets stretched, lawmakers are reluctant to supplement them with higher gas taxes or general 
fund revenue. That makes P3s an attractive option, and in some circles they have been portrayed as a 
miracle cure for the country’s crumbling infrastructure.”). 
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but not unheard of, in the context of social infrastructure—examples include 
hospitals, schools, and prisons, among others.51 
In the eyes of their supporters, P3s combine the efficiency of the private 
market with the government’s ability to avoid certain types of market failures.52 
In short, private firms may be able to deliver services more cheaply than the 
government. Private contractors typically cost less than public employees, in part 
because they lack the civil-service protections and generous benefits that 
government workers often receive. And private firms have ample incentives to 
drive down costs as much as possible so as to maximize profits. Competition for 
lucrative government contracts sharpens those incentives. 
In some areas, arguments like these might justify a complete shift from public 
to private provision of the relevant services. And, indeed, in some countries that 
is precisely what the term “privatization” refers to—rather than running, say, a 
water utility itself, the government sells it to private entities and gets out of the 
business altogether.53 But in areas where it is difficult to establish competitive 
market prices—natural monopolies, for example, or services that generate 
significant externalities—concerns about potential market failures may justify a 
continued role for government.54 Thus, the argument goes, public-private 
hybrids, or partnerships, can harness the relative strengths of both the public and 
private sectors to produce better results than could be expected from either 
sector working alone.55 
There are several reasons to hesitate before accepting this sunny vision of P3s. 
The first will be familiar to readers who are steeped in the literature on 
privatization more generally. As the previous Part explained, one of the reasons 
for market failure—and, by extension, for reliance on government to supply 
particular kinds of products and services—is that it is difficult for consumers to 
monitor the quality of outputs. In scenarios that feature such informational 
asymmetries between producers and consumers, competition among profit-
seeking firms will not reliably lead to better products and enhanced efficiency. 
On the contrary, the profit motive may lead firms to focus on easily measurable 
indicia of quality and to shirk on attributes that, although important, are harder 
to observe. One solution, then, is to rely on service-providers who lack the 
 
 51.  MOODY’S, supra note 4 (predicting that “social-infrastructure projects will continue to be in the 
justice and education sectors, with water and waste-water P3 projects to follow”). 
 52.  INT’L MONETARY FUND, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 10 (Mar. 12, 2004) (approved by 
Teresa Ter-Minassian) (“[S]tandard arguments for and against government ownership . . . can be used to 
motivate PPPs as a means of combining the relative strengths of government and private provision in a 
way that responds to market failure but minimizes the risk of government failure.”); WORLD BANK 
REPORT, OVERCOMING CONSTRAINTS TO THE FINANCING OF INFRASTRUCTURE 3 (Jan. 2014) 
(“Conceptually, PPPs are an instrument to respond to market failures while minimizing public sector 
short-comings as a service provider.”).  
 53.  See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 222 (describing privatization abroad).  
 54.  INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 52, at 10. 
 55.  Id. 
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incentive to maximize profit—namely, government and/or nonprofits.56 
The difficulty here should be obvious. If a major justification for government 
action is that the combination of informational asymmetries and profit motive 
produces undesirable outcomes, then outsourcing service-provision to private 
firms creates more problems than it solves. Whether this problem is likely to arise 
in the context of a given P3 depends in large part on whether it is possible for the 
government to specify in advance the hallmarks of a job well done. As others 
have recognized, “private provision may be workable if the government can write 
a fully specified, enforceable contract with the private sector.”57 But where 
“service quality is noncontractible”58—perhaps because means matter along with 
ends,59 or where success entails hard-to-pin-down values like “tender loving 
care”60—relying on private firms to deliver governmental services risks importing 
private market failure into the public sphere. This importation risk is significant 
where the government is not any better positioned than consumers to address the 
issues that lead to market failure, such as information asymmetry. 
A second objection to P3s is that the best-of-both-worlds argument supplies 
little reason to favor private financing; it focuses, instead, on the capacity of the 
private market to generate efficiencies in the production and delivery of goods 
and services. Recall that one of the reasons why government is able to avoid the 
sorts of failures that bedevil the private market is that it has the power to tax—
to compel payment from consumers who might otherwise be unwilling to 
contribute to the cost of collective goods.61 The advantage evaporates, however, 
if government must rely on voluntary investments from private firms. At the very 
least, it is far from clear that such investments will flow to the sorts of collective-
goods projects that would otherwise be undersupplied by the private sector.62 
 
 56.  See WEISBROD, supra note 1, at 45–46. 
 57.  INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 52, at 11. 
 58.  Id. (“In general, services for which overall quality is inherently noncontractible . . . are not 
candidates for PPPs . . . .”). 
 59.  DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 79 (explaining that outsourcing is most attractive in circumstances 
where ends matter more than means, because “[t]he more precisely a task can be specified in advance 
and its performance evaluated after the fact, the more certainly contractors can be made to compete”).  
 60.  WEISBROD, supra note 1, at 50. 
 61.  Cf. id. at 20 (“[T]he advantage that government has in its ability to tax, which bypasses private 
firms’ dependence on prices or user fees, is an advantage in fund raising, not in production.”). 
 62.  The problem flagged here may be ameliorated by an investment tool that is related to P3s but 
still in its infancy in the U.S.: the social impact bond (SIB), also known as “pay for success” or “social 
innovation bonds.”  SIBs ameliorate some of the concerns about subject-matter skew associated with 
P3s, because they tend to focus on public policies that lack any clear profit component. They work as 
follows: “Money from private donors and philanthropic dollars are invested upfront to help get the 
program off the ground. If the program meets the predetermined requirements over a specified time, the 
money is returned [by the government, with interest].”  Bill Bradley, Social Impact Bonds: Beneficial or 
Bureaucracy-Bloating?, NEXT CITY (May 8, 2014), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/senate-hearing-social-
impact-bonds-helpful-harmful [https://perma.cc/UZ2S-QWB2]; see also Matthew Bishop & Michael 
Green, Philanthrocapitalism Rising, 52 SOCIETY 541, 542 (2015) (“This is a way to transfer the risk of 
innovative public policy initiatives to the private sector, tapping non-profit operational expertise and for 
profit risk appetite.”); SOCIAL FINANCE, HOW PAY FOR SUCCESS WORKS,  http://socialfinance.org/how-
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This problem is most pressing in the context of demand-risk P3s, where the 
private investment is recouped primarily through user fees—payments by 
consumers who drive on toll roads, for example, or who use municipal parking 
spaces. From the perspective of would-be investors, that kind of deal makes no 
sense in areas that lend themselves to free riding, where private market failures 
would be most likely. It works only where consumers are, in fact, willing to pay 
for the service in question or where they can be compelled by the government to 
pay. To the extent that the service would not have been supplied on the open 
market, then, the reason is not market failure but government monopoly—a 
monopoly that the P3 effectively transfers to a private firm.63 
Availability-payment P3s may hold more promise in combining the 
government’s ability to avoid market failures with private-market efficiency. Like 
privatization more generally, the availability-payment model puts government 
itself in the role of consumer. Payment will come—ultimately—from the public 
coffers; the up-front private investment simply operates as a way of putting off 
the payday. 
Yet to the extent that P3s simply delay, as opposed to obviate, the need for 
public financing, they trigger a third reason for hesitation. The ready money 
provided by private investors allows today’s public officials to take credit for 
projects that tomorrow’s officials, and citizens, will have to pay for. Concerns 
about similar temporal dynamics have prompted many state governments to 
adopt limitations on allowable public debt.64 P3s tend not to trigger those 
limitations, however, because the obligation in question is contingent on certain 
performance benchmarks; in the argot of public finance, a contingent obligation 
does not count as debt.65 Thus, P3s may offer a means by which government can 
evade democratically enacted limitations on public revenue raising. The upshot, 
as we describe in more detail in the following Part, is that governments can give 
 
pay-for-success-works/ [https://perma.cc/X6BG-HRBB] (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (describing how SIBs 
are funded). SIBs have been used in the United States to develop programs designed at reducing 
recidivism, improving early-childhood education, and facilitating reentry by formerly incarcerated 
citizens. Bradley, supra. 
 63.  Monopoly conditions are, of course, another likely source of private market failure. See, e.g., 
Bozeman, supra note 15, at 146. See also Le Grande, supra note 10, at 439–40 (noting that “replacing a 
government monopoly provider with a private monopoly might have an inegalitarian impact on that 
distribution, because (a) the latter would have more incentive its position to exploit its position to 
maximize profits and (b) any profits would accrue to its shareholders instead of to all taxpayers”).  
 64.  As with restrictions on taxes, debt limitations may be substantive or procedural. Substantive 
limitations impose caps on debt; procedural rules require government to clear special democratic 
hurdles—such as voter approval, approval by a legislative supermajority, or both—before taking on new 
debt. RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 790 (7th 
ed. 2009). See also id. at 818 (explaining that limitations on debt “may be justified as a means of 
reconciling the conflict between short-term and long-term interest that debt creates . . . . [T]he ability to 
shift the costs of debt into the future may . . . induce elected officials to incur debt too easily [and] to 
approve projects that are not fully cost-justified. . . . After all, they can get the credit for the new project, 
but the blame for the additional taxes needed to finance these projects or for the diversion of tax dollars 
away from other future needs will be borne by their successors.”). 
 65.  Id. at 836. 
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lip service to fiscal austerity while offering consumers amenities that they cannot 
actually afford at current tax rates. 
B. Patriotic Philanthropy 
Private investment in government need not be motivated by a quest for 
profits. Individuals, groups, and firms also may donate money to government, 
much as they might donate to a nonprofit, or give money and other resources 
directly to those in need.66 Such “patriotic philanthropy”67 comes in various 
shapes and sizes. Some gifts are solicited by government actors.68 Others are 
made at the initiative of the donor. Some are open-ended, to be used by the 
recipient however it sees fit.69 Others are earmarked for specific purposes. 
It is difficult to develop a comprehensive sense of the substance of patriotic 
philanthropy, but gifts appear to cluster around certain types of initiatives.70 
Public facilities, for example, are recurring subjects of gifts. Relatedly, private 
gifts frequently support public exhibitions, both inside museums and outside in 
the form of monuments. Public schools also are longstanding—and 
controversial—targets of philanthropic giving. Public education was one of the 
earliest social services offered widely by government,71 and it is one of the few 
public services that state governments are constitutionally obligated to provide.72 
Yet private dollars have been part of the public-education equation from the 
outset, particularly in the South, where Reconstruction governments struggled to 
 
 66.  See Lemos & Charles, supra note 5, manuscript at 27–28; see also Beth Gazley, How 
Philanthropy Props Up Public Services and Why We Should Care, NONPROFIT Q. (Mar. 27, 2015) (giving 
to government is not new. As we have argued elsewhere, however, there is reason to think that the 
phenomenon is on the rise in the U.S.: “We know that philanthropic support for public services is growing 
rapidly, outpacing the growth of the charitable sector overall.”). 
 67.  E.g., Sophie Gilbert, David Rubenstein’s Patriotic Philanthropy, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/10/david-rubensteins-patriotic-philanthropy/382082/ 
[https://perma.cc/BYH9-B5VZ]. 
 68.  Jim Edwards, Why BP is Getting Fed Up with Florida Milking it for Advertising Money, 
MONEYWATCH (July 15, 2010), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-bp-is-getting-fed-up-with-florida-
milking-it-for-advertising-money/ [https://perma.cc/RB7F-Q6RU] (describing requests from Florida’s 
Governor Charlie Crist to BP for $75 million to support cleanup and tourism advertising in the wake of 
the BP oil spill).  
 69.  See David Margolick, Justice Holmes’ 1935 Bequest Remains Unfulfilled, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 
1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/03/us/justice-holmes-s-1935-bequest-remains-unfulfilled.html? 
pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/HR8E-SEY8] (an example is the Holmes Devise: “When Oliver 
Wendell Holmes died in 1935, he left the bulk of his estate, more than $260,000, to the United States 
Government. It was the largest unrestricted gift ever made to the American people . . . .”).  
      70.    See generally Lemos & Charles, supra note 5, Part II.C (offering examples). 
 71.  David Strong et al., Leveraging the State: Private Money and the Development of Public 
Education for Blacks, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 658, 659 (2000) (“Publicly funded and controlled systems of 
education were one of the earliest social benefits extended to the masses . . . .”). 
 72.  Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1122 (2014) (“While 
laws provide an entitlement to a public education, and we have long struggled to interpret what 
constitutes a legally adequate education, there is little to nothing to indicate what other services the local 
public sector must provide.”).  
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fund their newly created state-supported school systems.73 
Generalizations become more difficult when we move beyond these recurring 
categories. Some gifts offer financial support for law enforcement.74 Others 
promote improvements at the other end of the criminal-justice spectrum—for 
example, seeking to reduce alcohol abuse among offenders, or to improve the 
health and mental-health services offered by juvenile justice systems.75 
Community and economic development projects also tend to attract 
philanthropic gifts.76 The City of Detroit is perhaps the most striking example in 
this regard. Philanthropic organizations have played a leading role in the city’s 
revitalization, spearheading a variety of significant initiatives including the M-1 
rail—the country’s first public transit system planned by private and 
philanthropic actors, and funded largely by a combination of private investments 
and gifts.77 
Gifts are less common at the federal level than in states and municipalities, in 
large part because the default rule under federal law is that donors may not 
earmark gifts for particular purposes; instead, all donations must go to the 
general treasury.78 That rule can be—and often is—superseded by more targeted 
statutes allowing particular agencies or actors to receive private gifts. For 
example, the Department of Justice has statutory authority to receive gifts,79 as 
does the Federal Communications Commission,80 and the Library of Congress.81 
And some federal agencies have their own foundations devoted to raising private 
donations; examples include the Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, the 
Food and Drug Administration, the National Air and Space Administration,82 
 
 73.  See Strong et al., supra note 71, at 662–63 (describing the need for private donations to support 
public schools for both White and Black children in the South during Reconstruction, and how private 
financing continued to fill the void for many southern African-Americans after states started channeling 
public money exclusively into White schools).  
 74.  See David Amsden, Who Runs the Streets of New Orleans?, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/magazine/who-runs-the-streets-of-new-orleans.html 
[https://perma.cc/5ZSC-ZXXH] (describing gifts to law enforcement in Seattle and New Orleans). 
 75.  See Lemos & Charles, supra note 5, manuscript at 32 (describing such gifts in California and 
Michigan). 
 76.  Id. manuscript at 32–33. 
 77.  Id. manuscript at 33. 
 78.  The Miscellaneous Receipts Act requires federal agencies to turn over any funds to the general 
treasury, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2016), and the Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits agencies from expending 
funds in excess of their legislative appropriations, 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (2016). Close cousins to gifts 
to the general treasury, the Bureau of Fiscal Service may accept gifts to reduce the national debt. Over 
the last decade, totals have ranged from $2 to $7 million. See Gift Contributions to Reduce Debt Held by 
the Public, TREASURY DIRECT, https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/gift/gift.htm 
[https://perma.cc/D6XR-BT8U] (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).  
 79.  28 U.S.C. § 524(d) (2016). 
 80.  47 U.S.C. § 154(g)(3) (2016). 
 81.  2 U.S.C. § 156 (2016). 
 82.  Rick Cohen, Philanthropy Funding Government Work? There’s a Foundation for That—Several, 
Actually, NONPROFIT Q. (Apr. 13, 2012), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2012/04/13/philanthropy-
funding-government-work-theres-a-foundation-for-thatseveral-actually/ [https://perma.cc/XZ3N-
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and the National Park Service.83 
Even if the federal environment were more conducive to targeted gift giving, 
we suspect that the majority of gifts would still be aimed at state and local 
governments. Not only do state and local governments have greater needs for 
funds, but the smaller scale of local government creates more opportunities for 
gifts with meaningful impact. Perhaps not coincidentally, state and local law on 
gifts ranges from broadly permissive to silent, with only scattered restrictions.84 
As with P3s, there is an optimistic best-of-both-worlds story to be told about 
patriotic philanthropy. For those who harbor anxieties about private 
philanthropy because of concerns about accountability, transparency, and 
abdication of the government’s obligations, gifts to government may well look 
like a cure-all. The government is under no obligation to accept donations, nor 
to undertake the specific initiatives that private donors wish to fund. Unlike 
conventional philanthropy, then, patriotic philanthropy means that initiatives 
backed by private actors with big ideas and deep pockets must pass through a 
democratic check before being translated into projects with broad-based effects. 
There is also reason to believe that patriotic philanthropy might generate 
more private support for public projects than taxation alone. Research on 
taxation and charitable giving suggests that people are more willing to turn over 
their money to Uncle Sam when they can earmark the funds. One study 
concluded, for example, that “the antipathy often expressed toward taxation is 
due more to coercion or lack of control over the use of resources, rather than to 
government per se, and that taxpayers embrace the voluntary, earmarked feature 
of a gift to a specific government agency.”85 
Despite the manifest benefits of patriotic philanthropy, there are reasons for 
concern here as well. The previous section suggested that bringing for-profit 
investment into government could exacerbate rather than minimize concerns 
about government failure without doing much to reduce the potential for market 
failure. The argument here is similar: Notwithstanding the optimistic vision 
sketched above, there is a risk that running private gifts through government will 
deepen rather than resolve democratic objections. 
Patriotic philanthropy avoids the process-based objections to purely private 
philanthropy if, and only if, proposed gifts pass through a meaningful democratic 
process on their way to implementation. In at least some cases, however, gifts 
may change the democratic process, by skewing government priorities in the 
 
8KG5]. The CIA also has a foundation, In-Q-Tel, but it is more of an investment arm than a source of 
philanthropic donations. See IN-Q-TEL, https://www.iqt.org/about-iqt/ [https://perma.cc/C3CF-BBK9] 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (“IQT is the non-profit strategic investor that accelerates the development 
and delivery of cutting-edge technologies to U.S. government agencies that keep our nation safe.”).  
 83.  See About the Foundation, NAT’L PARK FOUND., https://www.nationalparks.org/about-
foundation [https://perma.cc/57ED-EJ2E] (last visited Mar. 23, 2018). 
 84.  See Lemos & Charles, supra note 5, manuscript at 34 & n.202. 
 85.  Sherry Xin Li et al., Giving to Government: Voluntary Taxation in the Lab, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 
1190, 1191 (2011). 
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direction of initiatives backed by private dollars. The key point here is that 
government officials may find it hard to turn down donations, especially big ones, 
and especially those that are offered by donors with whom the officials have—or 
might develop—ongoing relationships.86 First, officials may worry about the 
public-relations consequences of declining what appears to be free money. 
Particularly at a time when many government units are struggling to make ends 
meet, news that officials have foregone an opportunity to pad the public coffers 
may not sit well with voters. Second, and perhaps more significantly, officials may 
be concerned about the likely reactions of donors and would-be donors. In many 
cases, the proffer of a gift is not an isolated event but one moment in an ongoing 
and potentially beneficial relationship. Today’s gift, if handled well, may produce 
additional gifts down the road.87 The people who are capable of making large 
donations to government programs also are people who are likely to provide 
other kinds of political support, including campaign contributions and 
independent expenditures.88  Saying “thanks but no thanks” to such donors may 
seem imprudent at best, “political malpractice” at worst.89 Instead, as one critic 
put it, “[w]hen a multibillionaire gets an idea . . . [about] matters of important 
public policy and the billionaire is willing to back it up with hard cash, public 
officials tend to reach for the money with one hand and their marching orders 
with the other.”90 
Even if public officials are capable of declining proffered gifts, policy 
proposals that come with their own readymade funding sources—requiring 
reduced or delayed public outlays—will likely have an edge over initiatives that 
must be fully funded from the public fisc. That gravitational pull, moreover, is 
not limited to the initial bargain but extends through the life of the project. Losing 
private funding may seem even worse than refusing a gift at the outset. Thus, the 
same incentives that push government officials to reach for the money may also 
encourage them to hold tightly to funding already secured—even if doing so 
means contributing public money to the project or compromising other 
objectives.91 Similarly, when and if the worst happens and the private money runs 
 
 86.  See Lemos & Charles, supra note 5, manuscript at 35–41. 
 87.  Cf. Cohen, supra note 82 (describing research suggesting that “nonprofits have traditionally 
been averse to challenging their foundation funders . . . for fear of losing not only current funders but 
scaring off other foundations”). 
 88.  Goss, supra note 34, at 443 (“Donors also carry the promise of campaign cash, necessary to 
compete in the campaign finance arms race.”). 
 89.  David Morton, Miss Manor, WASH. CITY PAPER (Feb. 13, 2004), 
https://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/article/13028437/miss-manor [https://perma.cc/33B3-AJ8N] 
(quoting the D.C. Mayor regarding a proffered gift). 
 90.  Bob Herbert, The Plot Against Public Education: How Millionaires and Billionaires are Ruining 
Our Schools, POLITICO (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/the-plot-
against-public-education-111630 [https://perma.cc/LFR2-ZX6U]. 
 91.  See, e.g., Landow & Ebdon, supra note 6, at 737–46 (describing how city leaders in Omaha, 
Nebraska, acceded to the demands of private donors who had funded a new convention center and arena 
and then used the threat of withdrawing private funding to gain continuing leverage in negotiations over 
related projects). 
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out, sunk costs and reliance interests are likely to bias public decision making in 
favor of maintaining programs already in effect. Importantly, those ongoing 
effects often will spill over into other policy spheres, as gifts draw money and 
other resources toward donor-supported initiatives and away from alternative 
uses. 
The upshot is that patriotic philanthropy has the potential to induce 
government to undertake initiatives that would not otherwise be pursued. That 
can, of course, be a good thing: If the reasons why government would not 
otherwise have pursued the projects reflect public-choice dysfunctions or other 
sorts of government failures, the lure of seemingly free money can pull 
government in beneficial directions. But patriotic philanthropy can also 
contribute to, and exacerbate, the risk of governmental failure by making 
government all the more dependent on and responsive to moneyed interests. 
IV 
A BIGGER PIE? 
The discussion thus far has offered several reasons to hesitate before 
embracing private financing of government as a win-win scenario. An obvious 
response is that private money—whether of the for-profit or philanthropic 
variety—simply expands the public pie. Private financing, in other words, 
supplements the public treasury, leaving more money available to the state to 
focus on other priorities. For small-government conservatives, that response is 
hardly a cause for comfort. In this Part, we argue that the notion of an ever-
expanding pie should ring false even to those who would favor a larger public 
sector. As the old adage suggests, there are reasons to be skeptical that free 
money is in fact free. 
A. Reliance and Redistribution 
An initial reason for skepticism about the expanding-pie perspective is 
suggested by the discussion in the previous Part: Private financing might 
disappear for various reasons, and the state may be compelled to pick up the slack 
in funding, diverting resources from other potential uses. Private financing is 
significantly less dependable than broad-based, compulsory taxation, because it 
is based on the voluntary actions of a relatively small set of individuals or firms 
rather than payments extracted from the taxpaying public as a whole.92 
Proponents of using private funds to support public programs must therefore 
contend with the possibility that the private money might run out.93 
 
 92.  Cf. Salamon, supra note 23, at 40 (noting that “the voluntary system . . . has serious drawbacks 
as a generator of a reliable stream of resources to respond adequately to community needs”). 
 93.  Indeed, many P3s are designed with the intention that the private money will run out; the whole 
point is that the private “partners” provide an initial investment, which the government repays (with 
interest, of course) down the road. In these circumstances, any expansion of the public pie is temporary 
at best, and triggers the concerns about public officials’ incentives for temporal cost-shifting that we 
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One possibility, of course, is that privately funded programs simply exist as 
long as the private money is flowing into the public sphere. If the money goes 
away, so too do the programs—no harm, no foul. But it will not always be that 
easy. Once in place, public programs may be difficult to unwind. That is true not 
only of social infrastructure and programs (think public schools, for example) but 
also of the kind of transportation projects that tend to attract the most P3s. It is 
one thing to live without a new road. It is another to clear the countryside, 
construct a freeway, and then leave it to crumble into disuse when funding for 
upkeep evaporates. When reliance interests develop around particular initiatives, 
government may face intense pressure to keep them going—with public funds, if 
necessary. 
To be clear, the point here is not that it is always, or necessarily, cause for 
concern when private financing must be replaced with public support. On the 
contrary, private financing may operate as a spur to development or innovation 
in the public sector, encouraging the government to experiment with new 
programs and policies. The private, or voluntary, sector bears the initial risk of 
failure; tax dollars are put at stake if and when the projects in question prove to 
be successful. We do not deny that beneficial public policies can emerge from 
such scenarios.94 Yet recognizing the potential benefits need not mean ignoring 
the risks. If, as we have suggested, there is likely to be a political thumb on the 
scale in favor of programs that attract outside financing at the outset, we should 
be clear-eyed about the role that private money is playing in shaping the 
government’s priorities. And we should recognize that the fact that private 
money is supporting a program today does not mean it always will. In some cases, 
at least, private financing is likely to result in a redistribution of public resources 
rather than an expansion of the overall pie. 
B. Free Riding and Reverse Crowding Out 
Private financing for government might also affect the public fisc indirectly 
and over the long term, by shaping citizens’ preferences regarding public funding 
and taxation. There is ample evidence that public and private financing for public 
goods are sometimes substitutes rather than complements. As the significant 
literature on “crowding out” shows, governmental support for public goods 
sometimes displaces, or crowds out, private donations.95 A similar phenomenon 
 
flagged in the previous Part. 
 94.  See, e.g., Strong et al., supra note 71, at 662, 672–75 (explaining how initial private financing 
ultimately led to public funding of schools for African-American children in the south, and describing 
the initial donation as “a Trojan horse [that] allow[ed] blacks to ‘sneak past’ the normal barriers erected 
to their political influence”).  
 95.  See, e.g., James Andreoni & A. Abigail Payne, Is Crowding Out Due Entirely to Fundraising? 
Evidence from a Panel of Charities, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 334, 334 (2011) (“The classic theory of crowding 
out is that individual donors, who are also often tax payers, will treat their voluntary private contributions 
as a substitute for their involuntary contributions through taxation and, as a result, reduce giving to a 
charity by the full amount of the [government] grant [to a charity].”).  
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could arise in the context of private financing for government, just in the other 
direction: private money might crowd out public money. We refer to this 
phenomenon as reverse crowding out.96 
Consider the crowding-out question from the perspective of a citizen who 
lives in a world in which public goods can be funded either with public dollars or 
via private donations or investments. For present purposes, this hypothetical 
assumes a fully informed citizen: She knows that financing can in principle be 
either public or private, and she knows how programs are funded in fact. The 
citizen must ask herself why she should pay for public goods when someone else 
could pay for them. All else equal, the rational, self-interested taxpayer would 
prefer a world in which she has access to public goods but does not have to shell 
out for them. The more private money that is available to finance public goods, 
the more the fully informed taxpayer ought to favor a reduction in her tax liability 
in favor of private support. 
To the extent that this reverse crowding out story is correct, it reveals a deeper 
and more perverse problem: It transfers the free-rider problem from the private 
market to government. As explained in Part I, the government’s role in the 
provision of public goods is justified, in part, by its ability to address the 
shortcomings of the private market. One such shortcoming is the free-rider 
problem, in which an individual has an incentive to consume a public good but 
no incentive to pay for it. Government can solve this version of market failure 
because it can compel its citizens to pay taxes to support the state’s priorities. It 
can force everyone to pay for public goods, whether they consume them or not, 
and whether they would prefer to pay for them or not. 
As many states and local governments have learned, however, the 
government’s compulsory power is not without a significant limitation. Citizens 
must be willing to authorize the government to levy taxes. Once authorized, the 
levy is compulsory, but voters can impose substantial constraints on the 
government’s taxing power. Many states have adopted rules, either statutory or 
constitutional, that require proposed tax increases to run through legislative 
supermajorities or voter referenda, and/or that cap the permissible level of 
taxation.97 And even where taxes are set via normal legislative procedures, citizen 
opposition can make even modest tax increases extraordinarily difficult to enact 
as a political matter. 
In the absence of private funding of government-supplied public goods, 
citizens have a choice to make. They can either have the goods they want and pay 
for them in taxes, or they can stake out opposition to taxes and live with the 
 
 96.  Cf. WEISBROD, supra note 1, at 30 (recognizing the possibility of philanthropic contributions to 
government agencies, and observing that “voluntary contributions [may] not lead to increased 
governmental output, but to an offsetting decrease in tax-financed expenditures. . . . At issue is the 
magnitude of ‘crowding out’: increased private donations may decrease what government would 
otherwise have done.”). 
 97.  See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  
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resulting reduction in public goods. But citizens cannot expect to benefit from 
government-supplied goods and services without chipping in toward the cost. The 
availability of private funding for the government’s priorities introduces free 
riding into the calculus, because fully informed citizens now have the option of 
having the public good for free. One consequence of private financing, then, may 
be to reduce citizens’ appetite for taxes. 
The concern here is exacerbated by the fact that citizens may oppose 
particular government programs, either on grounds of principle or policy, or 
simply because they do not anticipate taking advantage of them. Tax payments 
cannot, of course, be earmarked, and taxes cannot be avoided on the ground that 
the would-be payer will not benefit from some or all of the services government 
provides.98 But private donations and investments can be earmarked, and they 
are voluntary. In that sense, private financing represents a move from a 
compulsory and collective ethos of funding—in which all taxpayers contribute to 
the full range of government programs, including those that redound to the 
benefit of others—to a voluntary, a la carte approach in which individuals and 
firms choose which initiatives their money supports.99 The more the latter 
approach appears to be an option—an alternative to conventional sources of 
public financing—the more difficulty government may face in drumming up 
political support for taxes. 
C. The Hollow State 
Crowding out depends upon information symmetry: The citizen has the same 
information as the government as to how public priorities are funded. Where 
citizens suffer from an information deficit vis-à-vis the state, they may not realize 
that free riding is an option, or that public money may be replaced by private 
dollars. Such information asymmetry may give rise to a different (albeit related) 
problem, one we term “the hollow state.” 
Information asymmetry with respect to the funding of public priorities 
precludes citizens from having an accurate gauge of the capacities and 
capabilities of the state. When the government’s financing scheme is not 
transparent and citizens are unaware that public programs are being propped up 
by private dollars, citizens may have an inflated sense of what their taxes can buy. 
 
 98.  See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 99.  As we have explained in other work, 
[t]o the extent that individuals can control the amount or use of their tax payments, they do so 
not as consumers—making self-interested determinations about what services they want and 
how much they are willing to pay—but by voting as citizens. As such, broad-based taxes both 
reflect and reinforce a form of ‘fiscal citizenship,’ which one performs ‘by contributing one’s 
appropriate share—however modest—toward the financing of the political community of which 
one is a member,’ and then ‘by becoming informed about government taxing and spending 
policies, and by becoming involved (at least as a voter, and perhaps more deeply) in the 
determination of those policies.’ 
Lemos & Charles, supra note 5, manuscript at 7 (quoting LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE 
FORM 1040: TWO CHEERS FOR THE RETURN-BASED MASS INCOME TAX 17 (2013)). 
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That is, they may assume, reasonably, that government services are being funded 
by public money. As a result, citizens may believe that the public treasury is 
capable of producing more goods and services than it actually is. This enables the 
government either to claim that it is being financially austere, and/or to brag 
about its capacity, while in reality providing services that it cannot afford at 
existing tax levels.100 
This kind of fiscal delusion might lower the public appetite for taxes, though 
for different reasons than the crowding-out concern described above. Even those 
who generally favor a robust state might oppose tax increases, based on the 
mistaken view that existing tax rates are sufficient to generate all of the public 
programs that they observe. Meanwhile, citizens who perceive that the 
government is doing too much might seek to limit or lower the government’s 
taxing power, which might further debilitate an already hobbled state. The 
effects, moreover, would not be felt across the range of government projects, but 
only those that are unable to attract private financing. As suggested in the 
previous Part, that is unlikely to be a random sample. On the contrary, it is likely 
to consist primarily of the kinds of programs for which society needs government 
most—because private support, either of the for-profit or philanthropic variety, 
would not be forthcoming without compulsion. 
Finally, the points we made at the outset of this Part bear repeating here: 
Constituencies and reliance interests can develop around existing programs, 
making those programs painful to dismantle if and when the private money runs 
out. We suggested above that one consequence is that public money may be 
pulled toward what were once private initiatives, diverting resources from other 
potential uses. But in some circumstances, there may not be any public money 
available to be repurposed. The state’s coffers may simply be empty. Thus, 
private financing may induce citizens to rely on public programs that they—and 
their government—cannot really afford, and to incur heavy switching costs (in 
terms of disruption, waste, and the like) if those programs have to be abandoned 
down the line. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
An increasingly common refrain in public discourse is that “[g]overnment 
can’t do it alone,”101 but needs help from the private and philanthropic sectors in 
 
 100.  See David Hall, Why Public-Private Partnerships Don’t Work: The Many Advantages of the 
Public Alternative, PSIRU 13 (Mar. 2015), available at http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/files/2015-03-
PPP-WhyPPPsdontworkEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QNL-T4NS] (describing, and criticizing, the link 
between fiscal austerity policies and an embrace of P3s abroad). 
 101.  Christopher Weber, The Problem with Public-Private Partnerships, NEXTCITY (May 7, 2012), 
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/the-problem-with-public-private-partnerships [https://perma.cc/99F6-
KXM4] (quoting Jacksonville mayor Alvin Brown); see also Carol Ebdon & Paul Landow, The Balancing 
Act: Using Private Money for Public Projects, 32 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Spring 2012, at 59 (noting that 
“[t]he estimated investment needs [for infrastructure] over the next five years are $2.2 trillion, which is 
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order to satisfy its obligations to the public. Yet we lack a coherent account of 
the relationship between private financing and public legitimacy. Does it matter 
for the legitimacy of a representative democracy that citizens broadly finance 
their government?102 
It might be that the best way to think about financing questions is from a 
utilitarian perspective: We ought to favor the mechanisms that deliver public 
goods to the public most efficiently. But that approach would ignore a 
fundamental argument from democratic theory. The lesson of modern 
democratic theory is that process matters—that a robust political process is the 
best way of ensuring that decisions about public policy are made in the interest 
of the public. American representative democracy envisions a government, 
elected by the people, that sets public priorities in the public interest. It assumes 
a certain set of values, like equal citizenship. 
It further assumes, as formal matter, that each citizen has both rights and 
obligations, which include voting as well as taxation. Borrowing Hirschman’s 
terms, everyone is presumed to have voice and to reciprocate with loyalty and 
not exit.103 Public financing is consistent with that vision, as it collectivizes the 
costs of public goods and eliminates the opportunity to opt out. As we have 
emphasized, citizens cannot avoid paying general taxes on the ground that they 
find certain government policies unnecessary or even offensive. In contrast to 
private financing, which enables those with means to use their personal funds to 
support the public initiatives that they prefer, general taxes force everyone to 
have skin in the game. 
If excessive private financing for government is inconsistent with key 
assumptions of democratic theory, what are its consequences for the public 
sector? If private financing does not simply supplement the existing work of 
government but changes it, should that be cause for celebration or regret? We do 
not purport to solve those fundamental questions in this brief essay. Our aim is 
significantly more modest and much less quixotic. Using public-private 
partnerships and patriotic philanthropy as points of ingress, we seek to highlight 
some of the benefits and risks of financing the public sector via organizations, 
and methods, typically associated with the private and philanthropic sectors. 
More broadly, we hope to stimulate a conversation about the consequences of 
relying on private funding for public priorities. 
 
 
beyond the collective ability of government to fund”); Stacia A. Wells & Robert M. Siegel, Fixing US 
Infrastructure: New Model P3 Law A Good Start, LAW 360 (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.law360.com/ 
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